MyGov digital failure: after £21.6m. was wasted for little gain, faster change and accountability is promised while a telling plea for political restraint is made
- Guernsey's failed MyGov digital transformation programme cost £21.6 million but delivered only £1.3 million in savings against projected £7.4 million annually
- Primary contractor Agilisys received £16.2 million despite the programme's collapse in August 2023, with efforts ongoing to claw back money
- Investigation found systemic failures including poor leadership, over-reliance on contractors, and a culture where senior staff cannot be held accountable
- The programme was 'never properly defined' and its complexity exceeded the organisation's capacity, with over 20 different governance boards creating confusion
- Chief Executive Boley Smillie has begun structural reforms including new accountability measures for senior leaders and outcome-based contracting
A damning investigation into Guernsey's failed digital transformation programme has revealed costs of £21.6 million - significantly more than the £18m stated in November - with minimal savings achieved and fundamental failures in project management.
The MyGov programme, intended to modernise government services and reduce public sector roles by around 200 positions, delivered only £1.3 million in savings against projected annual recurring savings of £7.4 million by 2021.
Nick Mann
The Chief Executive and Head of the Public Service Boley Smillie’s report found "limited evidence that these savings are directly attributable to the programme" and noted they "are not remotely proportionate to the scale of investment."
The majority of spending went to primary contractor Agilisys, which received £16.2 million. Additional costs included £1.6 million for external consultancy, £2.3 million for internal recharges, and £1.5 million for other expenses.
The report identifies multiple systemic failures that led to the programme's collapse in August 2023, including an engrained leadership model where the most senior staff cannot be held to account for their actions.
“The broad story of this program is that at given points when clearly things started to go wrong, the reaction, more often not, from leadership, was to kind of re badge, repackage, add to the governance that existed, rather than dealing with the underlying issues that were at hand.”
Mr Smillie has already begun the process of changing structures within the civil service in attempts to ensure this type of failure cannot happen again and confirmed attempts are ongoing to claw back money from Agilisys.
“I'm absolutely committed to making sure that every single issue I've identified is dealt with, whatever that means, and that's my job,” he told The Quarry.
“And everyone on the island really just needs to make sure they hold me to account for that rather than worrying about the rest.”
The report stops short of naming individuals.
“No one was named in the report because one of the conclusions I reached was that the way we treated our staff throughout the MyGov experience was was pretty appalling.
“People were left in the dark about change a lot of the time. They were really concerned. There were people that raised issues and said that the program was not going to deliver what it was intended to, and they were absolutely right.
“Those issues should never have never played out, and I'm not going to contradict myself by criticising how people were dealt with at that point and then playing out some of these issues in the media and on social media.
“I have committed to dealing with all of the issues, whatever they are, in respect of MyGov. I've signaled on a number of occasions that leadership changes are going to happen, directly and indirectly as a consequence of MyGov, and over time, people will see that start to happen, but ultimately I'm accountable for making sure it does.”
What the investigation found
The programme was "never properly defined" and its scale and complexity "exceeded the organisation's capacity to deliver it."
The project underwent repeated changes in scope, with services redefined multiple times, creating confusion over accountability and objectives.
Following a 2021 reset, programme documentation referenced over 20 different boards, groups, and teams as part of the governance structure. In his report, the Chief Executive stated this "extraordinary number of boards and forums involved in oversight created confusion over roles and responsibilities" and "diluted accountability."
Key decisions were frequently made outside established governance structures, with the report finding that "decisions were taken outside formal governance arrangements" and "not consistently reported back for formal consideration."
The relationship with Agilisys proved particularly problematic, with the contractor holding seats on the Programme Board. The report describes this as creating a conflict where "they were effectively marking their own performance while also shaping how it was reported."
The organisation lost "control over the authoring and content of key programme documentation," with Agilisys exercising "a degree of control that should not have been ceded to a third party."
Contracts were largely structured on a time-and-materials basis with "limited definition of outcomes," resulting in "open-ended billing, weak cost control, and limited ability to assess performance."
The report emphasises that "the most significant and lasting impact of MyGov has been on our people." The programme led to the loss of experienced staff and reduced morale across the organisation, occurring during the additional pressures of the COVID pandemic.
Staff who raised concerns were "often characterised as resistant or unhelpful" and "in some cases, they were excluded from discussions or forums and even reprimanded." This created "a culture where challenge was discouraged, limiting the organisation's ability to respond to emerging risks."
Political oversight was undermined by poor reporting quality. While civil servants typically "take pride in presenting information accurately," this "standard was not always met in the case of MyGov."
An over-reliance on Agilisys influenced information presentation, and "reporting did not consistently provide a clear or complete picture." As a result, "the full extent of risks and delivery challenges was not always visible," limiting opportunities for political intervention.
The investigation revealed a significant gap in senior leadership accountability. The most senior leaders are "deliberately excluded from standard civil service disciplinary and capability policies" with no alternative framework in place.
The report found "no clear evidence that programme performance, including the failure of MyGov, has been reflected in the performance assessment of those staff who were involved."
However, the Chief Executive emphasised there was "no evidence of intentional wrongdoing; rather, the programme was characterised by poor leadership and an overestimation of the organisation's ability to recover delivery and realise benefits."
How others have digital transformation
Bermuda launched a comprehensive digital transformation programme in December 2025 through a partnership with Paradise Mobile, Google Cloud, and Abacus. The programme emphasizes gradual implementation with careful oversight, training public officers to manage systems internally to reduce external dependency, and protecting citizen rights including privacy. The initiative includes creating a unified digital platform for government services while building internal capabilities and maintaining strong accountability measures.
The UK has experienced decades of digital transformation failures, with studies showing 70-80% of government IT projects failing to meet objectives. Key lessons include the need for smaller, modular projects rather than large-scale transformations, stronger internal capabilities, better supplier management, and clear accountability structures. The creation of the Government Digital Service (GDS) in 2011 aimed to address these issues through centralized oversight and spend controls, emphasizing user needs over technology-first approaches.
What comes next?
In response to these failures, reforms have been announced, including strengthening the Major Projects Portfolio Board with external expert volunteers, introducing Chief Officers aligned to Principal Committees, and simplifying governance structures organisation-wide.
“At the moment, the current strategic leadership team covers in effect the whole of the public service and responsibility for that,” said Mr Smilie.
“I think the organisation needs always to be aligned to the political structures in the political committees. The principle of having one accountable officer to a committee is really important. It's really important to make sure there are clear lines of accountability between politicians and civil servants. And so that's what I'll be seeking to deploy in the coming weeks, making sure that we've got the very best people in those roles.”
The contract with Agilisys was terminated in 2025, and an advisory panel of expert volunteers is being appointed for IT oversight. The organisation is rebuilding internal control of technology and systems.
Mr Smilie confirmed that there was an “ongoing conversation” between the States and Agilisys when asked if they would attempt to claw back any of the money spent. Their contract was much wider than MyGov and he said that there was absolutely no doubt in his mind that ending the relationship was the right thing to do.
“I think on the whole, we have not experienced what we should have done from a supplier paid that amount of money, given the result has been so far out of what was originally intended.”
Financial management will be strengthened with clearer accountability, funding tied to delivery milestones, and improved transparency. Suppliers will be excluded from governance structures overseeing their performance, with a move to outcome-based contracting.
Workforce development initiatives include investment in internal capability building, strengthened leadership accountability, and recognition of change management as core capability.
New accountability measures include a formal capability and disciplinary policy for senior leaders, performance management linked to delivery outcomes, and publication of senior leadership objectives.
The MyGov programme was brought to a close in August 2023 following intervention by the previous Chief Executive Mark de Garis and the Policy & Resources Committee.
“These findings do not define the civil service as a whole”
Mr Smilie said there were common themes from the findings of the MyGov investigation across other States projects that had not delivered the benefit, timescale and budgets promised.
“What I would like to make really clear, though, is that the findings here do not define the civil service as a whole,” he said.
“I know this will not necessarily lend itself to public opinion in the context of what I'm announcing today, but the vast majority of civil servants do an excellent job.
“They work really hard, they're really professional. They're really clear with politicians. And I think if you asked most politicians about how they're served on a day to day basis, they would give you a fairly glowing report of the effort and professionalism shown by civil servants.
“We clearly need to do a lot better on these transformational projects. But I also want people to see the real side of the civil service, which is not represented by what we found in MyGov, it is a much better organization than it otherwise receives the credit for.”
A pledge to put transformation in the hands of those that know the orgainsation best
MyGov predated the current Chief Executive by some years and action was already being taken to make some situations better.
“We need to go much harder and much faster.
“One issue that I am concerned about is the volume of projects and programs that the States has to cope with at any one stage.
“And there's got to be a really strong alignment between our political masters and the capacity that the civil service can hold. We've, in my view, got to find a way of doing fewer things really well, then lots of things that then results in the experience that we've certainly had with MyGov.”
The vision of My Gov, in terms of transforming how the public accesses States’ services, was fairly sound, he said.
“The one chance that MyGov had, in my view, was putting it in the hands of the employees that we have that know and understand this organisation better than anyone else.
“My focus going forward is that we make sure we're far more inclusive with our own people about the transformation that we're trying to make, because they genuinely do have the answers. They genuinely have the experience.
“We just need to equip them to be able to deliver it better and not expect them to do all of that, plus the day jobs and a lot of other stuff at the same time, there really is an issue with capacity.”
What we still don't know
Key terms
Q&A
Q: How much did the MyGov programme actually cost compared to original estimates?
A: The programme cost £21.6 million, significantly more than the originally stated £18 million, with the majority (£16.2 million) going to primary contractor Agilisys.
Q: What savings did MyGov achieve versus what was projected?
A: MyGov delivered only £1.3 million in savings against projected annual recurring savings of £7.4 million by 2021, with limited evidence these savings were directly attributable to the programme.
Q: What were the main reasons for the programme's failure?
A: Key failures included the programme never being properly defined, exceeding organisational capacity, poor contractor relationships with Agilisys holding seats on governance boards, and a culture where senior leadership couldn't be held accountable for poor performance.
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